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Epidemics
Gillian McKay and Melissa Parker
Introduction
An ‘epidemic’ is deﬁned as an increase in cases of disease over and above
what would normally be expected in a community or region during a speciﬁed
period. War, displacement, poverty and natural disasters are frequently asso-
ciated with epidemics, and it is not unusual for humanitarian agencies to be
called upon to prevent or contain them, especially in resource-poor settings.
Although there is a considerable body of literature critiquing the work of
humanitarian agencies on epidemics, it would be misleading to generalize too
readily from cases of failure. There are many instances in which they have pre-
vented the occurrence of epidemics, but these achievements have rarely been
recorded in any detail and they are hard to assess comparatively. This chapter
does not, therefore, attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of humani-
tarian engagement with epidemics. Instead, the ﬁrst part of the chapter pre-
sents three case studies from Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo – DRC), Haiti and Somalia. These case studies look behind the narratives
of ‘failure’ and ‘success’ to explore salient issues which routinely arise for humani-
tarian agencies working in challenging circumstances. The second part of the
chapter then turns to the largest humanitarian programme ever attempted to
control an epidemic: the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa between 2013 and
2016. In so doing, it becomes evident that humanitarian programmes, which
adapt and respond to the speciﬁc social, political and economic contexts in
which they are working, tend to be more eﬀective. It is also clear that the
nature of humanitarian engagement with epidemics is increasingly being
shaped by narratives linking infectious diseases with global security.
A mixed history of humanitarian engagement with epidemics
The inability to prevent the transmission of Vibrio cholerae and Shigella
dysenteriae in North Kivu region, Zaire (now DRC) in 1994
One much publicized ‘failure’ concerns the reported inability of humanitarian
agencies to prevent the transmission of Vibrio cholerae and Shigella
Humanitarianism; edited by Tim Allen, Anna Macdonald and
Henry Radice
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857432817/
dtp/9781857432817_text.3d;
dysenteriae in North Kivu region, Zaire (now DRC) in 1994. By way of
background, an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 Hutu Rwandans ﬂed to the region
during the period 14–17 July 1994. Some of these Rwandans were part of the
interhamwe (Hutu militia) and had actively participated in the genocide of
Tutsi Rwandans, but the majority played no such role. In all cases, they
sought refuge from possible revenge attacks by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan
Patriotic Front who had come to power. The poorly resourced towns of Goma
and Kibumbawere overwhelmed by the inﬂux of people, and thousands died on
the streets of Goma during the last two weeks of July (Goma Epidemiology
Group 1995). Large numbers of refugees were hastily moved to makeshift
camps in the region, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) attempting to coordinate the humanitarian assistance pro-
vided by various UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
military forces from Zaire, the USA, Canada and France (Adelman 1999).
Tragically, almost 50,000 people died from Vibrio cholerae and Shigella
dysenteriae during the ﬁrst month of mass displacement. To put it another
way, somewhere between 6 per cent and 10 per cent of the refugee population
died during this period (Goma Epidemiology Group 1995) and it has been
argued that ‘the disease eﬀectively followed its natural course, as [if] no action
was taken’ (Guha-Sapir and Salih 1995: 101). Others have taken a similar view,
including a senior director at Save the Children Fund UK, John Seaman, who
said that ‘the course of the cholera epidemic in Goma appears to have been at
best only marginally inﬂuenced by massive international action’ (1994: 34). The
Goma Epidemiology Group also recorded high rates of acute malnutrition
among children living in camps who were less than ﬁve years old. The pre-
valence ranged from 18 per cent to 23 per cent from 4–14 August 1994, and
these rates were contrasted with an estimated prevalence ranging from 5 per
cent to 8 per cent in non-refugee populations in Africa at the time.
Explanations for the failure of humanitarian agencies to prevent these
public health emergencies vary. It is, of course, hugely challenging to provide
adequate shelter, food, water, sanitation and health care to hundreds of
thousands of people with minimal warning in resource-poor settings. With
respect to the prevention of Vibrio cholerae and Shigella dysenteriae, it is also
important to note that both infections were already endemic in the region.
Given the speed with which people arrived in Goma and surrounding areas,
and the fact that the majority of them were initially reliant on untreated water
from Lake Kivu for drinking, bathing and washing clothes, it could even be
argued that epidemics were an inevitable outcome. Roberts and Toole (1995)
take this view. They present data suggesting that as many as one-half of all
cases of cholera had been contracted in Goma by 26 July (which was before
the establishment of many of the camps by humanitarian agencies), and they
also point out that there is no data demonstrating that the establishment of
refugee camps contributed ‘substantially’ to mortality from cholera.
These are useful points to raise, but foregrounding the paucity of data does
not disprove the point that humanitarian agencies may have helped to create
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the conditions for Vibrio cholerae and Shigella dysenteriae to spread. If the
accounts provided by the Goma Epidemiology Group (1995), Siddique et al.
(1995) and Waterman (2004) are accurate, then it seems likely that moving
large numbers of people into camps while simultaneously struggling to pro-
vide access to clean water, basic sanitation and eﬀective case management did
little to prevent transmission. Waterman (ibid.), for example, pointed out that
by 12 August there were still up to 1,000 people sharing a single latrine in
Mugunga camp, while the Goma Epidemiology Group stated that by the
time humanitarian agencies were in a position to provide each person with
one litre of puriﬁed water a day (which was signiﬁcantly below accepted
humanitarian standards of 15–20 litres a day), the epidemic had peaked.
Siddique et al. (1995) also demonstrated that fatalities from Vibrio Cholera
and Shigella dysenteriae in treatment centres were higher than anticipated due
to unexpected resistance to antibiotics such as tetracycline and doxycycline;
inadequate use of oral rehydration therapy; inappropriate use of intravenous
ﬂuids; and insuﬃcient experience of health workers in responding to severe
cases of these two diseases.
The challenges which faced humanitarian agencies in North Kivu region in
1994 foreground a number of crucial issues which remain important. First, a
comprehensive approach to epidemic preparedness and management at times
of conﬂict and mass displacement necessarily requires a highly coordinated
and well-resourced set of interventions. With around 450 international
humanitarian organizations arriving in Zaire in a short period, it took time to
establish mechanisms to intervene successfully. Countering critiques of chaos,
Stockton usefully points out that ‘If in Goma some agencies turned up
unnecessarily, it is very important to consider carefully what might have
happened if an insuﬃcient number had turned up’ (Stockton 1998: 359). It is
possible, for example, that Rwandan refugees might have ended up living in
ramshackle shelters on the outskirts of Goma, without ever acquiring access
to clean water or sanitation, and thus would have become indeﬁnitely vul-
nerable to contracting and/or transmitting cholera. In other words, fatalities
from cholera and shigella could have been even worse than those recorded in
the camps.
The need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach raises two further
related points: it is always going to be diﬃcult to predict the nature and scale
of resources that will be needed during a humanitarian emergency, and these
diﬃculties are compounded by the fact that even if agencies are technically
and logistically prepared, they rarely have any understanding of the socio-
political and historical context in which they are working. In the case of
North Kivu, this had catastrophic consequences. Thousands of interhamwe
managed to take advantage of the chaos on the ground. They reasserted their
authority over camp populations and highjacked mechanisms established by
humanitarian agencies for distributing food. This undoubtedly contributed to
the development of acute malnutrition among children in the camps (Passant
2009). The need to adapt interventions to speciﬁc social, political and
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economic contexts in which humanitarian agencies are working remains
important today.
The introduction of cholera to Haiti by UN peacekeeping forces in 2010
A second much publicized ‘failure’ concerns the introduction of cholera to
Haiti, following an earthquake in 2010. This earthquake killed around
220,000 people, injured a further 300,000 and left 1.5 million people homeless
(Disasters Emergency Committee 2015). Nine months later a cholera out-
break began north of Port-au-Prince, spreading across the country as well as
to the Dominican Republic and Cuba. There had not been a single recorded
case of cholera in Haiti before the earthquake (Jenson et al. 2011), and the
genetic analysis of the bacterium, Vibrio cholerae, subsequently demonstrated
that the disease was brought to the country by UN peacekeeping forces from
Nepal (Hendriksen et al. 2011). By the end of 2015 754,373 cases and a fur-
ther 8,964 deaths from cholera had been reported (WHO 2016b).
To understand how this situation came about, it is important to note that
Haiti has a long history of political instability and economic impoverishment.
At the time of the earthquake, there was a small wealthy urban elite living in
Port-au-Prince and the majority of the population were living on less than US
$2 a day (World Bank 2009; Rencoret et al. 2010). The country was grappling
with a complex array of socio-economic issues, including deforestation, land
erosion and rapid urbanization. Prior to the earthquake, an estimated 46 per
cent of the Haitian population were living in overcrowded, poorly built,
ramshackle houses in urban and peri-urban environments, often with limited
access to clean water, sanitation and health services (ibid.).
The combination of a weak infrastructure, chronically underfunded and
fragmented health services, as well as the destruction of a large number of
government buildings (including the government’s Emergency Operations
Centre, courts and police facilities), the collapse of the UN headquarters in
Port-au-Prince, and the death of almost one-third of Haiti’s civil servants,
prompted a huge international response. In fact, more than US $13.5 billion
was allocated to Haiti by a variety of governments and humanitarian agencies
(Knox 2015). The Oﬃce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aﬀairs
(OCHA) and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) attemp-
ted to coordinate humanitarian activities. This was no easy task: an estimated
2,000 NGOs oﬀered assistance in the ﬁrst year, 400 of whom provided health
care. In addition, 26 countries provided military support (including the USA
which sent 22,000 soldiers). Reﬂecting on these events, Kirsch et al. have
argued that the situation in Haiti was an ‘atypical disaster response driven by
the U.S. government and military’ (Kirsch et al. 2012: 200).
Whatever the driving force, a great deal was achieved in the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake. This included the provision of food, water and
health care to hundreds of thousands of people. Nevertheless, serious tensions
emerged between those receiving international assistance and those
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attempting to meet their needs. Some of these tensions reﬂect the fact that a
considerable number of humanitarian workers had little or no understanding
of the political, social and economic contexts in which they were working.
Avoidable issues – such as ﬂying in staﬀ who did not speak French or
Creole – hampered the relief eﬀort. Resettlement programmes were delayed or
never completed, in part because the relevant humanitarian agencies did not
engage eﬀectively with the complex legal issues surrounding the ownership of
land, and there was widespread criticism at local, district and national level of
high NGO overhead costs that reduced the amount of money available for
direct relief (Elliott and Sullivan 2015).
The introduction of cholera by UN peacekeeping forces from Nepal exa-
cerbated the growing tension and mistrust between Haitians and humanitar-
ian workers, fuelling rumours and conspiracies about the ‘hidden’ motivations
underpinning the work of humanitarian agencies. The situation was not
helped by the fact that it took nearly six years for the UN to acknowledge
that the infection had been brought into the country by its own peacekeeping
forces (Katz 2016). These issues remain ongoing. For example, Haitians
attacked UN convoys delivering ‘aid’ following a hurricane in 2016 (Brice
2016); and Twitter was used by members of the public to speciﬁcally ask for
donations to be made to Haitian NGOs rather than to humanitarian agen-
cies, such as the American Red Cross (Agerholm 2016).
It is also important to note that while the initial cholera epidemic was
brought under control, there is every indication that it will not be eliminated
in the near future. Cholera is a disease of poverty and local conditions favour
transmission. In the ﬁrst four months of 2016, for example, there were almost
14,000 reported cases of cholera, and these numbers exceeded those reported
in the same period of 2014 and 2015 (Pan American Health Organization
2016). In other words, cholera has become endemic in Haiti as a direct, albeit
unintended, consequence of humanitarian assistance with the earthquake.
These troubling events do not negate the fact that hundreds of thousands of
people received shelter, food and health care in the wake of the earthquake.
They do, however, point to a very mixed picture of humanitarian engagement
in Haiti.
Humanitarian interventions controlling epidemics among dispersed
populations: polio in the Horn of Africa, 2013–2014
In contrast to the preceding case studies, this case study analyses why huma-
nitarian agencies were able to ‘successfully’ contain the spread of polio in the
Horn of Africa. This was particularly impressive, given that Somalia has suf-
fered from protracted war and conﬂict for several decades, with famine, epi-
demics and mass displacement occurring on a regular basis. Indeed, at the
time of the outbreak, humanitarian agencies faced major diﬃculties while
operating in many parts of the country due to ongoing insecurity, a weak
infrastructure and numerous communication and coordination challenges.
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Nevertheless, although the 2013–2014 outbreak of polio in Somalia spread to
Kenya and Ethiopia, it was possible to interrupt transmission relatively
quickly. This was not only because an eﬀective vaccine was available, but also
because detailed plans had already been drawn up to improve immunization
coverage levels prior to the outbreak. Crucially, these plans involved ensuring
that the immunization programme responded to the locally speciﬁc social and
political issues shaping coverage levels.
According to Kamadjeu et al. (2014), the outbreak began in Mogadishu,
and spread to 46 districts in South and Central Somalia, over a period of
eight months. There was a total of 195 cases in Somalia, and a further 14
cases in Kenya and nine cases in Ethiopia. In contrast to the situations
described in Goma in 1994 and Haiti in 2010, a coordinated body called the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative, involving the World Health Organization
(WHO), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO)
as well as international NGOs (such as the Catholic Relief Services and the
American Red Cross), worked closely with local government oﬃcials from the
Somalian Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Livestock to interrupt
transmission (UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Oﬃce 2014).
Containment in urban and suburban Mogadishu was rapid and eﬀective.
The outbreak was declared by the Ministry of Health within hours of the ﬁrst
case being conﬁrmed, and radio commercials and NGO-led social mobiliza-
tion eﬀorts were up and running 72 hours later to inform populations of
forthcoming immunization campaigns. These campaigns started ﬁve days
after the ﬁrst conﬁrmed case (UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regio-
nal Oﬃce 2014). Nevertheless, the outbreak presented considerable challenges
in the rural areas of Puntland, north-eastern Somalia and the Somali region
of Ethiopia. These places are inhabited by pastoralists, many of whom are
mobile, diﬃcult to reach, and distrustful of government and/or international
agencies. It was, however, possible to design and implement interventions in
the light of long-term, detailed social research among pastoralists as well as
experiences acquired by international agencies.
Strategies for increasing the coverage of polio vaccination programmes
included tracking nomadic groups and working closely with clan leaders. Pre-
existing and predominantly trusting relationships had already been estab-
lished by FAO’s animal health projects (Haydarov et al. 2016), and the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative built on these networks by holding polio
immunization days in places where people were already known to congregate
with their livestock, notably watering points and markets. To encourage
attendance, animal vaccination days were held at the same time (Kamadjeu et
al. 2015). Participation was particularly eﬀective because it was informed by
‘a thorough understanding of [pastoralist classiﬁcation systems] and power
structures; the spatial and temporal dimensions of their movement patterns;
their beliefs and values; how to establish trust through respectful dialogue;
and the services that they found most relevant’ (Haydarov et al. 2016: 14). In
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short, it was possible to halt the transmission of polio by adapting the inter-
vention to the local social and political contexts in which infection was
occurring.
The changing nature of humanitarian engagement with epidemics: Ebola
in West Africa, 2013–2016
The outbreak of Ebola in 2013–2016 presented unique challenges to huma-
nitarian INGOs, multilateral and bilateral agencies, and the governments of
the aﬀected countries. The ﬁrst reported case occurred in December 2013 in
Meliandou, a small village near Gueckedou, in eastern Guinea (WHO
2015b). The virus subsequently spread to ten countries, with Sierra Leone,
Liberia and Guinea facing the largest burden of cases. By 2016 there were
28,616 reported cases and 11,310 deaths (ibid. 2016c). These numbers are
high, and far exceed the total number of cases and fatalities recorded in pre-
vious outbreaks in DRC, Uganda and South Sudan. This case study asks:
why did Ebola spread so quickly in these three African countries? Why did
the outbreak mobilize such a substantial response from humanitarian actors?
What were the social and economic ramiﬁcations of such a large multi-agency
international response? Is the involvement of military actors part of a broader
change linking health and disease with global security?
Explanations for the rapid spread of Ebola are numerous and include the
following: ﬁrst, all three countries were recovering from protracted war and
conﬂict, with economic impoverishment aﬀecting the majority of the popula-
tion. In 2014, for example, the UN Human Development Index ranked
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea 174, 177 and 178, respectively, out of 187
(UN Development Programme 2013). Related to this, the health systems in
all three countries were characterized by limited resources, expertise and
funding. As a result, surveillance systems were initially far too weak to detect
unknown viral haemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola (McPake et al. 2015).
Second, the initial index case of Ebola occurred in eastern Guinea, close to
the border of Sierra Leone and Liberia, but a considerable distance from the
capital cities of Conakry, Monrovia and Freetown. With a long history of
people moving easily and regularly across borders for both social and eco-
nomic reasons, day to day mobility facilitated the transmission of Ebola in
the region. It also enabled the spread of the disease to densely populated
urban and peri-urban areas (Flahaux and De Haas 2016; ECOWAS-SWAC/
OECD 2006). A third and related issue is that the respective health systems in
Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia were organized in diﬀerent ways, and there
was no collaborative history of addressing public health problems spanning
borders. It thus took time to establish eﬀective systems for sharing informa-
tion between the diﬀerent Ministries of Health in the three aﬀected countries.
Fourth, at the beginning of the outbreak, fatalities from Ebola were high,
with estimates ranging from 50 per cent to 70 per cent mortality in conﬁrmed
cases (Whitty 2017; Fitzpatrick et al. 2015). Understandably, this generated
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fear, panic and anxiety, especially as there was no vaccine at the time, and the
biomedical treatment available for people infected with Ebola was limited.
Insuﬃcient staﬃng and limited medical supplies did little to appease the
situation. Although biomedical understandings of the aetiology, treatment
and prevention of Ebola changed during the outbreak, with guidelines,
directives and messages regularly being updated to accommodate new
knowledge, these changes created confusion across the region. For example,
Ebola Treatment Centres (ETCs) were built with a view to isolating and
caring for suspected and conﬁrmed Ebola patients. However, many people
were reluctant to seek a diagnosis and/or present themselves for treatment. In
part, this reﬂected the fact that many of the early messages to members of the
public from Ministries of Health stated that Ebola could be fatal in 90 per
cent of cases, and they did not emphasize that survival rates were higher with
treatment. That said, the situation was far from stagnant. As expertise about
how to treat people increased and as sick individuals were identiﬁed earlier in
their disease course, survival rates improved. This, in turn, encouraged people
to come to ETCs, but it took time to establish eﬀective processes and secure
trust (albeit partial) from the wider population.
Fifth, the imposition of bylaws to control and/or prohibit population
movement, as well as the widespread use of quarantine measures, was very
strict in some places. These measures did little to quell anger, fear and suspi-
cion, with resistance to the response being openly expressed to both govern-
ments and humanitarian agencies, particularly in the early stages of the
outbreak. One much cited example of resistance to the quarantine bylaws was
the attempt to cordon oﬀ the entire West Point neighbourhood of Monrovia.
Tragically, this led to violence between the residents and security forces and
the death of a 15-year-old boy (Onishi 2014). Furthermore, those quarantined
were often not provided with food or water in a timely manner, nor was there
any mechanism to ensure that their livelihoods would be protected. Such
issues help to shed light on why some people hid themselves away when they
or their families got sick, while others (sometimes successfully) escaped their
enforced conﬁnement.
Sixth, humanitarian agencies were unprepared for the epidemic and they
were quickly stretched to their limits in terms of both expertise and capacity.
In contrast to previous outbreaks, which involved a smaller number of agen-
cies with expertise in Ebola, the West African outbreak involved a large
number of agencies, the majority of whom had no previous experience of
Ebola. Initially, they had little, if any, idea about how to engage with people
at a local level with regards to this disease, and this often led to disorganized
and conﬂicting approaches and advice. The large number of foreign agencies
and actors on the ground also meant that the governments of the aﬀected
countries struggled to coordinate their activities and lead the response, a
point made by (McPake et al. 2015) when comparing Sierra Leone’s Ebola
response with that of northern Uganda. This also links to concerns about
global health governance and the fact that key institutions, including WHO,
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were far too slow to respond to the outbreak (Moon et al. 2015). Although
some INGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, reacted quickly to contain
the outbreak, other organizations were completely unprepared to work in a
setting with active Ebola transmission and responded by withdrawing per-
sonnel and closing down their operations.
Whatever the explanations for the transmission of Ebola within and
between Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, it is also the case that the epi-
demic mobilized considerable resources and personnel. According to WHO
(2015a), 58 international medical teams deployed around 2,500 personnel to
work in more than 60 ETCs. These teams came from Europe, the USA,
Cuba, the People’s Republic of China, Australia and several countries in the
African Union (DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda). They worked along-
side thousands of colleagues employed by Ministries of Health and NGOs in
the three aﬀected countries. The scale of the response is further exempliﬁed by
the fact that an estimated US $3.75 billion was spent on containing the virus
between December 2013 and August 2015 (DuBois and Wake 2015). Indeed,
it is noteworthy that this ﬁgure is higher than the combined annual govern-
ment budget of $2.37 billion for the three countries prior to the epidemic
(CIA 2013).
The unprecedented scale of the response created a variety of challenges for
governments and humanitarian agencies. In particular, the rapid inﬂux of
large sums of ‘Ebola money’ distorted local economies and disrupted social
relationships. In Sierra Leone, for example, young men, including motorcycle
drivers, were recruited by INGOs onto burial teams. They were paid con-
siderable sums of money for collecting and disposing of dead bodies, and
their newfound wealth enabled them to set aside or challenge the views of
their elders (Lipton 2017). Tensions were also evident among frontline health
workers. ETC staﬀ employed by INGOs received substantial salaries and
weekly risk allowances of up to 500,000 Sierra Leonean leones (Le), which
were paid swiftly and reliably. By contrast, staﬀ who were employed by the
Ministry of Health and Sanitation with similar qualiﬁcations in tertiary and
secondary hospitals, received smaller salaries but similar risk allowances, but
these salaries and allowances were frequently paid late, erratically or not at
all. A further source of tension was that contact tracers and community sur-
veillance oﬃcers were paid considerably less (Le 100,000), even though they
were having to identify Ebola cases at a community level, often without
access to protective equipment, while staﬀ employed at Primary Health Units
did not receive any kind of risk allowance (Sierra Leone Ministry of Health
and Sanitation 2015).
The sudden and unexpected availability of ‘Ebola money’ ﬁltering through
governments and humanitarian agencies not only disrupted social relation-
ships, fuelling rumours and accusations of witchcraft (Shepler 2017), but it
also distorted local economies. As the US Department of State (2013) pointed
out, shortly before the outbreak, an estimated 72 per cent of the population
were living on less than US $1 a day (or Le 4,200). With large numbers of
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Sierra Leoneans engaged in the response, many of whom had no formal
employment prior to the outbreak, ‘Ebola money’ contributed to a sudden
rise in the price of primary products (FAO 2014) while simultaneously redu-
cing the purchasing power of government employees (such as teachers and
university staﬀ) whose salaries often went unpaid due to the closure of
schools, colleges and universities during the outbreak. Other occupational
groups were also aﬀected, including those employed by mining companies,
due to the closure of many mines. Similar issues were reported in Liberia and
Guinea, with all three countries reporting considerable disruption in the pro-
duction of iron ore (World Bank 2016). Additionally, restrictions on the
movement of people and goods, including border closures, reduced internal
and regional trade for a wide range of other products. The impact on agri-
cultural production is less clear but it is likely that the Ebola outbreak dis-
rupted planting in many places, leading to reduced yields of rice and maize,
and fuelling further increases in the price of primary products (ibid. 2015).
These issues aside, there is no doubt that a unique challenge facing huma-
nitarian agencies during the Ebola outbreak concerned the militarized nature
of the response. This took slightly diﬀerent forms in each country. In Sierra
Leone, for example, the Minister of Defence was appointed the director of the
National Ebola Response Centre and the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces
played a pivotal role coordinating the response. In Liberia, the Minister of
Health and Social Welfare directed the national response, but the military was
still inﬂuential, albeit in a more supportive way (Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015).
In all cases, the governments deployed their armies to help to set up road-
blocks, assist with ‘lockdowns’, identify new cases, control access to hospitals
and ETCs and – in the case of Liberia – ensure that bodies were cremated,
rather than buried (ACAPS 2015; Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015). In addition,
5,000 military personnel were deployed by China, Canada, France, Germany,
the UK and the USA. These foreign militaries built more than 3,000 ETC
beds (ibid.).
While some scholars and humanitarian agencies welcomed the contribution
of both national and international armed forces, albeit in a limited way
(Medécins Sans Frontières 2015; Dizard 2014), others have been more scep-
tical (de Waal 2014; Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015). The primary justiﬁcation
revolved around the point that there was no choice other than to impose
states of emergency and to use the military. All three countries had weak
health systems, lacked the civil resources and personnel to respond eﬀectively,
and required broad-based strategies involving restrictions on movement, the
imposition of quarantine (to varying levels) and the ‘safe’ disposal of bodies.
Given that international armed forces were largely willing to restrict their role
to the construction of ETCs, the transportation of goods, and supporting the
coordination of the response; and given that local populations appeared to
have more trust in their national armies than the police – at least in Sierra
Leone – then one might reasonably ask: why not draw on these resources in
an emergency? The counter-arguments include the fact that the international
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armed forces were expensive and ineﬃcient. On occasion, they took months,
rather than weeks, to build ETCs compared to some of the INGOs doing
similar work (Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015). A further issue is that all three
national armies fostered an atmosphere of intimidation and fear which hin-
dered eﬀorts to interrupt transmission. Indeed, at a time when it was vital for
local populations to comply with wide-ranging public health measures, there
were numerous indications (particularly in Guinea and Liberia) that the
militarization of the response may well have exacerbated fears, diminished
trust in biomedicine and, ultimately, had a counterproductive impact.
Irrespective of the advantages and/or disadvantages of militarizing the
response, the fact that national and international armed forces were thus
engaged reﬂects a broader shift in the increasing militarization of global
health more generally. This has been made possible by the emergence of a
strong narrative linking disease outbreaks to the failure of states, as well as to
regional and global security. It is epitomized in UN Security Council Reso-
lution 2177 which states that ‘the outbreak is undermining the stability of the
most aﬀected countries … and unless contained, may lead to further instances
of civil unrest, social tensions and a deterioration of the political and security
climate’. The Resolution also states that ‘the unprecedented extent of the
Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and
security’ (UN Security Council 2014). Undoubtedly, the reference to ‘inter-
national peace and security’ is a way of referring to fears and anxieties of
resource-rich nations. After all, in 2013, the year immediately prior to the
Ebola outbreak, an estimated 21,000 people died from malaria and a further
8,000 children under the age of ﬁve years are reported to have died from
diarrhoeal diseases in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone (WHO 2016a). Such
high fatalities have not elicited anything like the same response. It is also
striking that a few months before the outbreak of Ebola, polio was declared a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern by WHO, but received far
less international attention (McInnes 2016). In short, humanitarian engage-
ment with the outbreak of disease is now profoundly shaped by a narrative
linking health and disease with global security.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented a series of contrasting case studies to reﬂect on the
ways in which humanitarian agencies have engaged with epidemics. While not
purporting to present a comprehensive overview, the cases foreground some
of the complex issues that routinely arise. These include the challenges of
preventing the spread of infectious diseases in countries with a long history of
war, conﬂict and mass displacement. In such places, the infrastructure is
usually weak; sanitation facilities and supplies of clean water limited or non-
existent; Ministries of Health are under-resourced; and international staﬀ
with an understanding of the social, political and economic contexts in which
they are working are often scarce. The arrival of hundreds of international
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organizations, all with slightly diﬀerent but overlapping expertise, adds to the
challenges of providing an appropriately resourced and coordinated set of
interventions.
Other issues are unique to the particular setting and outbreak: the failure
to prevent the transmission of Vibrio cholerae and Shigella dysenteriae in
North Kivu in 1994, for example, raised diﬀerent social, political and logis-
tical issues to those occurring in Haiti following the earthquake and the
introduction of cholera by UN peacekeeping forces from Nepal in 2010.
These issues were diﬀerent again from those occurring during the outbreak of
polio among dispersed and nomadic populations in Somalia, or the outbreak
of Ebola in West Africa. Here, the absence of a vaccine, high levels of noso-
comial infection, partially eﬀective treatment, high fatality rates and the
spread of the disease to urban areas within West Africa as well as to Europe
and the USA triggered a large and unprecedented response, involving inter-
national humanitarian agencies, bilateral agencies, and national and interna-
tional armed forces. In contrast to previous military engagements during
outbreaks of disease, some of the armed forces were involved in more than
the provision of logistical support and controlling the movement of people. In
Sierra Leone, for example, they were closely involved in the design and
implementation of policy with civilian partners. This reﬂects the increasing
tendency for humanitarian engagement to be ever more linked to the secur-
itization agenda. Above all, this chapter demonstrates that in such instances
where interventions pay close attention to both the coordination of activities
by diverse agencies while simultaneously adapting to the unique and diﬀering
social and political contexts in which epidemics occur, assistance tends to be
more eﬀective.
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